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The interest of social scientists in complexity theory has developed rapidly in recent years. Here, I consider briefly the
primary characteristics of complexity theory, with particular emphasis given to relations and networks, non-linearity,
emergence, and hybrids. I assess the ‘added value’ compared with other, existing perspectives that emphasise
relationality and connectedness. I also consider the philosophical underpinnings of complexity theory and its reliance
on metaphor. As a vehicle for moving away from reductionist accounts, complexity theory potentially has much to say
to those interested in research on health inequalities, spatial diffusion, emerging and resurgent infections, and risk.
These and other applications in health geography that have invoked complexity theory are examined in the paper.
Finally, I consider some of the missing elements in complexity theory and argue that while it is refreshing to see a
fruitful line of theoretical debate in health geography, we need good empirical work to illuminate it.
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with the ‘‘chaos/complexity’’ programme, not for
reasons of fashion or even legitimate career building
but because this is the way the world works and we
need to understand that (Byrne, 1998, p. 161).Introduction
This paper considers—in a sympathetically critical
way—the rapidly expanding ‘complexity turn’ within the
social sciences and, specifically, the relevance it has for
geographies of health (Gatrell, 2002). Complexity hase front matter r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserve
cscimed.2004.11.002
24 593754; fax: +44 1524 592401.
ess: a.gatrell@lancaster.ac.uk (A.C. Gatrell).emerged during the past 5 years as a potentially
integrating theme in contemporary social science (Byrne,
1998; Urry, 2003). Urry (2003, p. 12) observes that
complexity is ‘a potential new paradigm for the social
sciences, having transformed much of the physical and
biological sciences’. He sees it as a means of dissolving
some of the binary divides (whether quantitative/
qualitative, environmental/social, structure/agency, or
medical/sociocultural) within the academy. He even
suggests that complexity might help break down
divisions between the social and the natural sciences
(Urry, 2003, pp. 12–13, p. 17).
The engagement of social geographers with the
complexity agenda has, to date, been modest (though
see the important paper by Thrift, 1999). Manson (2001)
has offered a valuable critique of the relevance complex-
ity theory has for geographical research as a whole. Myd.
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field of health geography and to consider the extent to
which complexity theory (hereafter, CT) ‘adds value’ to
existing relevant perspectives in health geography.
I first consider briefly what complexity theory
amounts to; what are its key features? I then consider
the philosophical underpinnings of CT as an anti-
positivist perspective, and its reliance on metaphor.
Next, I review several broad areas of research in which
health geographers are engaged and discuss and evaluate
how complexity theory has been used in each. I conclude
with an assessment of some of the missing elements in
CT and suggest that while we should welcome any
engagement with theory in health geography, we also
need sound empirical work to set alongside this.A simple look at complexity theory
Key characteristics of complexity theory
A system is ‘complex’ when it displays the character-
istics outlined in Table 1 (based on Cilliers (1998) but
supplemented with a set of simple illustrations of what is
meant by each characteristic). In essence, a system
displays complex behaviour when its elements interact in
a non-linear fashion, such that it is impossible to predict
the behaviour of the system as a whole from knowledge
of the elements themselves. I focus on four key aspects
of CT that are embedded in Table 1: relations and
networks; non-linearity; emergence; and hybrids. I end theTable 1
The main features of complex systems (partly based on Cilliers, 1998
Characteristics of complex systems
Large number of elements, interacting dynamically (via flows
of material or information) across networks
Interaction is rich and may involve both human and non-
human agents (hybrids) or elements
Interactions may be short range but the richness of interactions
or relations across networks means that ‘influence’ can be wide
ranging
Each element is ‘ignorant’ of the behaviour of the system as a
whole; therefore, we cannot understand the system by
‘summing’ or ‘averaging’ the behaviour of individual
components; system-wide properties emerge
Interactions are non-linear (which also implies that small causes
have large results). There are feedback loops, of varying kinds
Complex systems are open systems, interacting with
environment
Complex systems are far from equilibrium
Complex systems have a history; their past is ‘co-responsible’
for their present behaviouraccount with a brief consideration of links to chaos
theory (which is associated with, but pre-dates, the
emergence of CT).
One must begin with some notion of what the ‘system’
is that is under consideration, and which is in some way
‘complex’. In a biological setting this might be an
ecosystem, comprising sets of plants and animals and
accompanying soil–climate sub-systems. In social
science it might be a transport network that moves
people and goods from one place to another, a system
that includes ‘hybrids’ of social and material elements.
In a health context it might be the set of elements that
permit and constrain the spread of a virus within a local
community and beyond. These elements could comprise
the virus itself, infected and susceptible individuals,
health-care resources, transport systems, and so on. It is
the relations between system components that are pre-
eminent—how these links and connections bind together
the system elements (Capra, 1997).
A considerable volume of material—much of a quasi-
popular nature (Baraba´si, 2002; Watts, 1999) is now
emerging on networks. The relationship of this to
complexity is well-expressed by Baraba´si (2002, p. 7):
‘Most events and phenomena are connected, caused by,
and interacting with a huge number of other pieces of a
complex universal puzzle. We have come to see that we
live in a small world, where everything is linked to
everything else. We are witnessing a revolution in the
making as scientists from all disciplines discover that
complexity has a strict architecture. We have come to
grasp the importance of networks’ (my italics). Both)
Example (health related)
A population in which people influence each others’ health-
related behaviour, or transmit infections among each other
People interact with other agents and organisations (health-
care providers; health-promoting and health-denying activities
and facilities)
‘Friction of distance’ implies interactions tend to be local, but
time-space compression means that interactions having health
consequences can be ‘at a distance’
One is generally ignorant of the possible system-wide
consequences of one’s health-related behaviour; the ‘public
health’ is more than the sum of individual disease profiles
Disease outbreaks that are highly localised can spawn
epidemics or even pandemics
The health system is only closed at a global level, and even then
it is open if we consider global environmental change
Population growth and movement ensures that the system is
never fully stable
Migration, history of inequalities
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apparently complex structure and organisation of net-
works of various kinds, including the social networks
that link complete strangers anywhere in the world by
about six intermediaries. This is the so-called ‘small-
world’ problem first developed in detail in the late 1960s
by the social psychologist Stanley Milgram. Buchanan
(2002, p. 127) considers that ‘the small-world discovery
and other ideas now growing out of it represent one of
the first great successes of the theory of complexity’.
By non-linearity we mean that small changes in one
component or element of the network do not lead to
correspondingly small changes in others. A change in
one element is not directly proportional to change in
another; more prosaically, little changes can have big
effects. By feedback is meant the arrangement of
networked relationships such that one element affects
others which in turn can, ultimately, affect the original
element. A very simple example would be that vehicle
exhaust emissions increase the burden of air pollution,
which may in turn increase the incidence of asthma. A
control mechanism (and hence negative feedback) might
be to reduce traffic levels, thereby cutting exhaust
emissions.
The emergence of new structures, via the interactions
of system elements, and of new forms of behaviour, is
critical to the understanding of complex systems (Hol-
land, 1998). Relationships ‘shift and change, often as a
result of self-organisation’ (Cilliers, 1998, p. viii–ix), and
new system properties may emerge. ‘The capacity for
self-organisation is a property of complex systems which
enables them to develop or change internal structure
spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope with, or
manipulate, their environment’ (Cilliers, 1998, p. 90).
Self-organisation does not imply some teleological
control mechanism; rather, it implies a process whereby
complex structure emerges through simple, unstructured
beginnings. Others speak of autopoiesis (literally, self-
making), where each system component aids the
transformation of other components; the network
makes itself. What might be examples of emergent
properties in the geography of health; what emerges at a
collective level that cannot be reduced to statements
about individuals? The ‘health’ of a neighbourhood or
community could be said to emerge from the activities
and health profiles of the local population, as well as the
nature of facilities (health-promoting and health-deny-
ing) located there. ‘Social capital’ would be another
example of an emergent property. Conversely, the
mortality profile of such a neighbourhood is, in effect,
the summation of individual deaths and would not be
said to be an emergent property.
Last, we must note that complexity theory entails a
fusing of the natural or material and the social. Urry
notes that ‘the so-called social sciences now deal with
hybrids of physical and social relations, with no purifiedsets of the physical or the social. Such hybrids include
health, technologies, the environment, the internet,
automobility, extreme weather and so on’ (Urry (2003,
p. 2). The recognition that complexity theory gives to
connectedness and hybridity, and to breaking down
divisions (whether the social and material, structure and
agency, or macro/micro) means that it has much in
common with actor-network theory (Milligan, 2001;
Law & Moll, 2002), although as yet there seems little
coming together of actor-network and complexity
theorists.
A brief comment is required on the relationship of CT
to the better-known chaos theory. Reitsma (2003, p. 14)
sees chaos theory as dealing with simple, deterministic,
non-linear, dynamic, closed systems that are sensitive to
initial conditions. Conversely, complexity theory focuses
on non-linear, open systems. These respond to perturba-
tion by organising into emergent forms which cannot be
predicted from knowledge only of the system parts. As
Sherden (cited in Thrift, 1999, p. 61) argues: ‘Chaos
refers to turbulent behaviour in a system where the
behaviour is totally determined by non-linear laws which
amplify the smallest of errors in the initial conditions of
the system, making the system unpredictable beyond the
shortest of periods. Complexity refers to the phenom-
enon of order emerging from complex interactions
among the components of a system influenced by one
or more simple guiding principles’.
What methods do we have that allow us to visualise,
describe, and analyse relational structure, without
decomposing the system into constituent elements?
Possibilities here would include the ‘rich pictures’ of
Peter Checkland’s soft systems methodology (Check-
land, 1981), qualitative mathematical approaches such
as Q-analysis (Gould, 1981), or visual-exploratory forms
of statistical analysis, such as correspondence analysis
(used in Bourdieu’s early work and championed by
Byrne (1998, pp. 86–87) as a means of exploring the
dynamics of the social world; see Gatrell et al., 2004, for
an application). In all of these methods, the emphasis is
very much to avoid imposing linear statistical models on
reality. In the modelling of complex systems, Cilliers
(1998) considers that connectionist models of complex
systems (such as those based on neural nets) are useful.
New wine in old bottles?
Some characteristics of ‘complex’ systems (such as
relationality, networked connections, non-linearity and
feedback) are shared with systems approaches that have
been in existence for 50 years or more. The concern with
relations is common to all systems-based approaches
(including the General Systems Theory with which
geographers toyed in the mid-late1960s; Manson, 2001,
p. 406). Further, the argument that relations are more
important than the objects or system parts is shared with
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(and his predecessor Elias: see Shilling, 1993) sought to
stress the ‘profound relationality’ of which Urry (2003,
p. 122) speaks (Bourdieu, 1984).
Further, the current pre-occupation of complexity
theorists with network structure resonates with one of
the archetypal areas of positivist spatial analysis, namely
network analysis (see, for example, Haggett & Chorley,
1969). It is somewhat ironic to think that this might be
reappearing (Baraba´si, 2002; Watts, 1999; Buchanan,
2002) after being largely ignored by geographers for 25
years. This neglect was occasioned by the emphasis of
spatial analysts on network description and spatial
form, and the lack of any social content. However, the
considerable contemporary effort expended on shedding
light on the structure of social networks (and particu-
larly the ‘small-world’ problem) seems little concerned
with the realities of social interaction. A Rwandan
refugee may be six steps away from the President of the
United States, but the probability of them ever
interacting directly is vanishingly small. Comments such
as ‘[t] he global village we’ve grown used to inhabiting is
a new reality for humans’ (Baraba´si, 2002, p. 39) ring
rather hollow for most of the billions living in the
village. Moreover, a very respectable literature on social
networks and health has built up (see, for example,
Cattell, 2001), without recourse to complexity theory.
Is complexity theory therefore merely 1970s systems
theory by another name? To what extent is complexity
theory just new wine in the old bottle of a systems-based
approach? One can read in Stafford Beer’s iconoclastic
systems-based book, published over 25 years ago, many
of the elements of a complexity account (Beer, 1975).
However, while classical systems approaches emphasise
problem-solving, prediction and control, complexity
theorists undertake exploratory research that empha-
sises explanation and understanding. Moreover, while
relations and networks are critical in complexity theory,
as they were in classical approaches, CT foregrounds
notions of emergence and hybrids. It is these features
that perhaps provide ‘added value’ and which were
missing from classical systems-theoretic accounts. In
reviewing health geography accounts that have invoked
CT, we need therefore to be alert to the extent to which
they draw upon these features as well as more
conventional system properties.
Philosophical underpinnings and the value of metaphor
I want here to consider briefly the philosophical
underpinnings of CT and the extent to which it draws,
productively or otherwise, on metaphor.
Byrne (1998, p. 35) argues that complexity accounts
are a part of the modernist programme and that
‘Bhaskar’s scientific realism provides a philosophical
ontology which fits pretty well exactly with the scientificontology underpinning the complexity programme’.
Complex accounts are ‘absolutely not reductionist and
positivist’. Like Urry, Byrne sees complexity theory as a
way of relating macro and micro, agency and structure.
In contrast, Cilliers (1998) identifies complexity as a
postmodern enterprise. For him, postmodern (perhaps,
better, post-structuralist) means a sensitivity to complex-
ity. This is roundly endorsed by Henrickson and
McKelvey (2002), who suggest that the ontology of
postmodernism parallels that of complexity scientists.
‘The lesson from complexity science is that natural
scientists have begun finding ways to practice normal
science without assuming away the activities of hetero-
geneous autonomous agents. There is no reason, now,
why social scientists cannot combine ‘‘new’’ normal
science epistemology with postmodernist ontology. Yet
very few have done so’ (Henrickson & McKelvey, 2002,
p. 7293). Stewart sees complexity theory as ‘a child of
the enlightenment’ (Stewart, 2001, p. 334) although he
also notes its use as an argument against positivism and
instrumentalism in social science.
Stewart is highly critical of the use of metaphor in
complexity theory. ‘The concepts and the poetic imagery
of complexity theories may indeed throw light on social
process; however [whether there is] a universal social
attractor must be determined by social debates and
research rather than by complexity metatheory’ (Stew-
art, 2001, p. 332). For Stewart, ‘the application of
metatheoretical organismic models to society and its
subsystems seems highly pre-mature; and physicalistic
accounts of non-linearity in society that exclude the
symbolic systems of classification are dabbling with the
edges of social structure and systematic features’
(Stewart, 2001, p. 351). We therefore need to consider
briefly the value, or otherwise, of the metaphors that are
part of the currency of CT.
While imploring us to consider the relevance of the
physics of complexity for contemporary social science,
Urry argues that physical science models should not be
directly transplanted into the social sciences. Rather, he
wishes to ‘consider whether complexity could generate
productive metaphors for the social analysis of various
‘‘post-societal’’ material worlds’ (2003, p. 121). Thrift,
like Urry, considers CT to be ‘deeply metaphorical’
(Thrift, 1999, p. 36), but, interestingly, the metaphors
‘nearly all strongly depend upon the visual register’
(Thrift, 1999, p. 37). Thrift further notes (1999, p. 49)
that ‘the use of ‘‘scientific’’ metaphors adds a touch of
legitimacy’ for some knowledge networks (such as New
Age practices)—echoing the more trenchant (and con-
troversial) critique of Sokal and Bricmont (1998). These
authors consider that ‘examples of scientism can be
found in the alleged ‘‘applications’’ of the theories of
chaos, complexity and self-organisation to sociology,
history and business management’ (Sokal & Bricmont,
1998, p. 181). They are not against ‘extrapolating
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extrapolations made without argument—or throwing
around scientific jargon in front ofynon-scientist read-
ers without any regard for its relevance or even its
meaning’ (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998, pp. ix–x). The
importing of concepts must have some conceptual or
empirical justification. They observe that ‘a metaphor is
usually employed to clarify an unfamiliar concept by
relating it to a more familiar one, not the reverse’ (Sokal
& Bricmont, 1998, p. 9). Further, ‘The natural sciences
are not a mere reservoir of metaphors ready to be used
in the human sciencesyin a scientific context these
words (chaos, non-linearity, for example) have specific
meanings’ (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998, p. 177). They seek
theorising that is supported by empirical evidence if it is
to be taken seriously and not simply an opportunity to
borrow uncritically from the physical sciences.
While, therefore, metaphors are appealing and, in
some cases, essential to the development of social
science, we need to be wary of those who seek to dress
up what might be rather ordinary accounts with the
somewhat casual use of concepts drawn from complex-
ity theory.Complex geographies of health?
Why might complexity theory appeal to health
geographers? There are several reasons. First, CT is
transdisciplinary (Albrecht et al., 1998); many of the
leading exponents are those with training in the physical
sciences but who are now working across the physical
and social sciences. Traditionally, health geographers
have drawn upon many disciplines (including epidemiol-
ogy, statistics, sociology, ecology, cultural studies) to
inform their work and so any post-disciplinary perspec-
tive that applauds this fuzziness of boundaries is
something to which we might be expected to warm.
Second, according to Urry (2003, p. 111) CT subverts
the distinction between agency and structure; if we want
to gain some understanding of the emergence of
structure, we need to understand the behaviours of the
agents that form part of the system. However, while this
has obvious appeal across much of the social sciences,
not exclusively the geography of health, it is a feature
shared with other perspectives (for example, the
structurationist accounts of Giddens, or Bourdieu’s
relational sociology).
Third, the metaphors, and some of the methods, used
in complexity theory are essentially visual. Despite the
disappearance of the graphical and the carto-graphical
from much of the research literature, the ‘seeing eye’ and
the ability to detect and describe pattern remains at the
forefront of many research methods, including health
geography (see, for example, MacKian, 2000). Fourth,
there is an attraction to moving away from reductionistaccounts. ‘Far too often attempts at the development of
a quantitatively founded causal account in sociology
have been relatively trivial models of the determinants of
outcome for individuals or other entities within a social
system. What is required is a return to the concern with
the nature of the social system as a wholey’ (Byrne,
1998, p. 56, my emphasis). I find this characteristic
particularly persuasive, since far too much epidemiology
is of the ‘risk-factor’ type in which particular factors are
controlled in order to reveal the independent effects of
others; context and relationship are often marginalised.
Last, Urry’s recent landmark text (2003) is entitled
‘Global Complexity’. If we still claim to be geographers,
students of the earth, it seems more than a little odd for
many of us (but not all: see Mayer, 2000, for example) to
be ignoring the ‘big’ questions of global inequality,
global disease burdens, and the large-scale social and
economic processes that create patterns of health at the
global scale. Might we not seek to use complexity theory
to do less work at very fine spatial scales and more at the
global scale?
I consider below some areas of research in which a
complexity ‘take’ has been adopted, and, briefly, areas
where it might prove productive.
Health inequalities
Brown and Moon (2002, pp. 362–363) note that the
new public health has ‘advocated a multi-causal
approach that saw infectious and chronic, degenerative
disorders as being the result of a complex interaction
between biophysical, social or psychological factors’ (my
italics). Complexity is about relationships that cannot be
reduced to simple linear models or their variants (such as
logistic regression). It counters much traditional (geo-
graphical and environmental) epidemiology and public
health that relates health outcomes to determinants at
the individual level. Even the now widely used multi-
level modelling (MLM) is cast within the same mould,
since it fails to capture connection, relationship and
context in an adequate way. While Byrne (1998, p. 68)
says that ‘the world does consist of things which contain
thingsythe hierarchical character of data is real’, and
Krieger (1994) also applauds the use of MLM as a
device for capturing the often-missed contextual factors,
it is doubtful that MLM offers an adequate methodol-
ogy for capturing the complexity of context. It is not just
the individuals or a simple aggregation thereof that
matter—the containing social system matters too.
Interestingly, Byrne goes on to mention Richard
Wilkinson’s work, in which death rates (from the
aggregation of individuals) are related to inequality
(‘an emergent property of the relationship between
individual incomes and wealth’—Byrne, 1998, p. 70).
Unemployment rates, tenure patterns, mortality are
examples of system properties with social significance
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segregation and social capital.
Krieger (1994) discusses the metaphorical ‘web’ of
causative factors and disease outcomes in epidemiology,
‘an elegantly linked network of delicate strandsysym-
bolising diverse causal pathways’ (Krieger, 1994, p. 890).
But, as she notes, the ‘web’ was ‘spiderless’, positing a
biomedical model in which the orientation was indivi-
dualistic rather than population-focused and reflecting a
concern less with epidemiological theory and more with
epidemiological methods. One alternative to a web-
based approach would be a political economy perspec-
tive in which the health status of different social groups
(women versus men, gays versus straights, black versus
white, poor versus rich) are compared in terms of the
relations between such groups. Krieger, however, prefers
an ‘ecosocial’ epidemiological theory in which popula-
tion-level approaches are combined with biological
thinking. She would replace the web metaphor with a
‘fractal’ metaphor in which biological and social factors
are linked at every level or scale. Admittedly, ‘this is not
a developed metaphor’ (Krieger, 1994, p. 899); none-
theless, at a very broad scale it is very much in keeping
with a complexity agenda in which there are no sharp
boundaries between global social relations and the
environment (Urry, 2003, p. 46).
Rod and Deborah Wallace have traced the dynamics
of socially and physically disintegrating inner-city
neighbourhoods in the US, particularly the Bronx
district of New York City during the 1970s. They see
the links between these processes (or urban desertifica-
tion) and health-related outcomes (AIDS, TB, violence)
in explicitly systems terms, speaking of their coming
together in a ‘mutually reinforcing nexus’ (Wallace &
Wallace, 1997, p. 789; see also Wallace et al., 1999).
Elsewhere, ‘the physical decay of community increases
social disorganisation leading to behavioural pathology
which triggers yet more physical destruction and so on
in a destabilising positive feedback loop’ (Wallace &
Wallace, 1997, p. 798). There is a tipping point at work
here: ‘We will suggest that relatively ‘‘small’’ perturba-
tions of public policy or socioeconomic structure can be
amplified by stressed human ecosystemsyso as literally
to shatter community structures’ (Wallace & Wallace,
1997, p. 791). This is particularly so where the
community is stressed already or marginalised.
There is a clear and direct link between the Wallaces’
work and that emerging from those exploring social
capital in public health contexts. For the Wallaces, local
communities and neighbourhoods are a complex system
of friendship, kinship and acquaintance networks,
together with associational ties (churches, social clubs
and so on). Disruption of these networks has health
consequences: ‘public policies of disinvestment in urban
minority communitiesywill, through a variety of inter-
acting and self-reinforcing mechanisms, slowly erode theprobability of effective interaction between individuals
or extended families within those communities. At some
point those policies will reduce that probability below
threshold, causing a sudden fragmentation of pre-
existing community structures’ (Wallace & Wallace,
1997, p. 798, my italics).
Neighbourhood deterioration has severe impacts on
all social networks that are health sustaining. Thus, they
suggest, deteriorating local environmental context may
trigger sudden disruption of social networks, which will
fragment communities and enable the emergence of a
social context in which disease and unhealthy beha-
viours emerge. These system shocks, they argue, get
transmitted from place to place—from the worst-
affected central cities into surrounding suburbs, via
commuting fields: ‘Ultimate endemic levels of emerging
or reemerging infectious disease within the most
devastated neighbourhoods of the largest citiesywill
strongly drive endemic levels in counties and metropo-
litan regions connected to them by the socioeconomi-
cally determined travel patterns which structure the
USA at regional and national scales (Wallace &
Wallace, 1999, p. 1800). So, at a national scale the
prevalence of AIDS in the USA is accounted for by
social proximity to (contact with) New York City, as
well as a measure of social disintegration (violent crime)
and manufacturing employment. Using methods from
the study of ecosystem dynamics, the authors show how
we might estimate the impact, on the system, of external
perturbations such as economic decline, population
turnover, or welfare reform. The system resilience is
quantifiable. The response is to reconstruct communities
and community infrastructure.
In another work (Wallace & Fullilove, 1999), Wallace
considers the ‘drivers’ behind community instability.
These include the size of the marginalised community
and the level of community resources (aggregate
income). The authors warn that: ‘batter the vulnerable
and generate murder, AIDS, and multiple-drug-resistant
tuberculosis, often in far more than proportion to that
battering, because phase changeyis highly non-linear
and sensitive to external perturbation’ (Wallace &
Fullilove, 1999, p. 733, my italics). In his care-
ful overview of the Wallaces’ work, Gould (1993,
pp. 124–135) draws explicitly on complexity ideas, using
a phase diagram that helps scientists to visualise how
a complex system changes over time by tracing
its trajectory (Gould, 1993, p. 128; see especially his
Fig. 10.1).
I consider that the Wallaces’ research is among the
most persuasive CT-based accounts in health geogra-
phy, not least because it rises above metaphor to draw
upon the literal basis of systems theory, but also it
foregrounds issues of emergence that underpin complex-
ity theory. Further, one important conclusion we take
from the Wallaces’ work is that we neglect spatial
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and is considered next.
Spatial diffusion of disease
If we consider disease diffusion at the global scale we
can see clearly the impacts that disease outbreaks in one
part of the world have, very rapidly, on social life both
close by and at some distance. The complexity theorist
Buchanan (2002) refers to the sudden break-out of HIV
infection from its likely hearth in Lake Victoria. We
could also note the Ebola and Lassa fever outbreaks in
European countries and, most recently, the SARS
(severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreaks in Hong
Kong and mainland China, leading rapidly to infection
in parts of Toronto, wholly as a result of air travel. This
is dramatic evidence of globalisation, or a borderless
world of global relations. It is also a good example of
non-linearity and the ability of a small event to trigger
disruption on a global scale.
Further, there is, quite literally, non-linearity occa-
sioned by the doubling of airline capacity (doubling the
number of seats means a four-fold increase in opportu-
nities for disease spread: Haggett, 2001, p. 646). Perhaps
too we can see the change from classical ‘contagious’ to
‘hierarchical’ to ‘network’ diffusion in which disease
spread is both rapid and web-like? Buchanan (2002,
p. 181) notes that some ‘aristocratic’ networks (where
there are a few highly connected people) do not need a
threshold or tipping point. Such networks ‘do not
possess an epidemic threshold below which diseases
cannot produce a major epidemic outbreak or the onset
of an endemic state. [These] networks are therefore
prone to the spreading and the persistence of infections,
whatever virulence the infective agent might possess’.
The implication is that the ‘connectors’ have to be
targeted. In other words, change the structure of the
network and the spread is halted. This was very much
the argument in Peter Gould’s work on HIV/AIDS
(1993). Gould shows very clearly how HIV is ‘traffic’ on
a structure or ‘backcloth’ formed by relations among
human actors; ‘to stop the HIV traffic transmission you
have to break the connections and so fragment the
backcloth’ (Gould, 1993, p. 33; see also Baraba´si, 2002,
pp. 123–142; Buchanan, 2002, pp. 170–183).
At a regional and local scale, the existence of a
‘tipping point’ is crucial in whether a disease becomes an
epidemic. For example, Buchanan (2002, p. 163) refers
to the epidemic of syphilis in Baltimore in 1995. ‘One
infection may have been triggering, on average, just less
than one other infection, and so the disease was keeping
itself in check. But then crack cocaine, a few less
doctors, and the dislocation of a localised community
out into the larger city pushed the disease over the
edge—it tipped, and these little factors made a very big
difference’. However, surely we need to understandbetter the ‘upstream’ factors—why the doctors were cut,
why crack cocaine was being used, why people were
removed from their homes, and so on; surely some
further social theorising is required? This is provided in
the Wallaces’ accounts and suggests some potentially
fruitful integration between spatial diffusion and health
inequalities research trajectories.
Disease ecology and ‘re-emerging diseases’
Albrecht et al. (1998, p. 73) argue, in their ‘pitch’ for
complexity, that: ‘The interaction of host and parasite,
the role of vectors, the host’s state of health, genetic
predisposition, standards of hospital infection control,
the way humans produce food and a multitude of social
factors will all have some influence on disease out-
comes’. They refer to a study of Japanese encephalitis in
northern Thailand, which illustrates ‘the characteristic
in complex systems of interactive causality among
people, the mosquito, the virus, domestic animals, and
introduced technology’ (Albrecht et al., 1998, p. 72).
Clearly, in the light of statements such as these we need
to develop further the connections between the complex-
ity agenda and the disease ecology tradition that pre-
dates it by several decades (Meade & Earickson, 2000:
Chapter 2; Levins & Lopez, 1999). Mayer (2000, p. 937)
notes that a key principle of disease ecology is that
‘population, society and both the physical and biological
environments are in dynamic equilibrium’. But a key
feature of CT is that systems may be far from
equilibrium (Table 1), in which case we need, as Mayer
argues, a good understanding of the impact that land-
use change, climate change, population turnover, and so
on have on population health. In particular, the
emergence and resurgence of particular diseases needs
to be set in the wider context of changes that are
economic, political and social, as well as environmental.
A good example would be Lyme disease, where ‘[t]he
chain of events that have led to the emergence and
recognition of Lyme disease in New England is complex’
(Mayer, 2000, p. 942). It is, Mayer argues, ‘reductionist’
to suggest that the ‘cause’ of Lyme disease is to be found
simply in a good understanding of the pathogen
involved. But to take other examples (such as TB and
HIV/AIDS) we need to develop a better understanding
of the links between population health and the processes
of globalisation. Among these processes Mayer gives
prominence to those of population movement.
Similar views are expressed by the Harvard Working
Group on New and Resurgent Diseases (1996, p. 170):
‘if one lesson has emerged from the spectacular failure of
Western medicine to eradicate certain diseases, it is that
diseases cannot be reduced to a single cause or explained
within a prevailing linear scientific method: complexity
is their hallmark’. I think we need to carve out research
agendas that fuse globalisation debates, disease ecology
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cal work.
Complexity and risk
A good case can be made for taking a complexity
approach to global system shocks (technological risk).
Nuclear and other localised technological accidents can
have global consequences (Chernobyl or Three Mile
Island are obvious examples). In other cases, the health
impacts of other disasters are contained or more
localised, though nonetheless potentially devastating at
that scale. For example, radioactive contamination from
Sellafield is thought by some to have given rise to
localised leukaemia clusters (though this remains a
contentious theory), while the Bhopal disaster in India
had a local and regional impact on thousands of people,
mostly the poor living in the vicinity of the plant
(Gatrell, 2002, Chapter 7). Health risks are not
necessarily global but may be locally, regionally or
perhaps nationally contained; distance is not yet dead.
The 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the UK
was a monumental upheaval to the British agricultural
and countryside system. It resulted from one tiny ‘blip’
in the constant movement of cattle to abattoirs, a blip
that nonetheless carried the infection from one farm to a
market from whence the disease spread rapidly. Again, it
is the movement (flow) that matters, a set of relations
that involves hybrids of human and non-human actors.
Loss of income to farmers and those institutions and
businesses sustaining the farming community, together
with the tourist sector, were all unintended conse-
quences, forcing, in effect, the virtual closure of the
countryside (Convery et al., 2005) for about 12 months.
‘This has in part led to a loss of self-esteem, an
increasing sense of isolation amongst livestock farmers
and called into question a ‘‘whole way of life’’ and social
identity’ (Convery et al., 2005). In Cumbria, 40 per cent
of farms were subject to animal culls (rising to 70 per
cent in the north of the county), with over 1 million
sheep, 215,000 cattle, and 39,000 pigs slaughtered. The
scale of slaughter impacted on local sense of identity and
‘on their everyday living and working relations with the
landscape, livestock and with others in their commu-
nityythere was a clear breach of normal relations’
(Convery et al., 2005, original italics). ‘Death was in the
wrong place (the farm rather than the abattoir), but it
was also at the wrong time (in relation to the farm
calendar) and on the wrong scale (such large-scale
slaughter seldom occurs at the same time)’ (Convery
et al., 2005).
So, a small perturbation can have dramatic conse-
quences (in this case for the mental health and
psychological well-being of many rural dwellers), just
as ‘countless unorchestrated historical events have left
their traces all over our social and ecological networks,the World Wide Web, and so on’ (Buchanan, 2002,
p. 97).
Ordinary lives in ordinary places
Graham Rowles (2000) is interested, and has been for
over 25 years, in the lives of older people and how these
are played out in places, particularly in rural Appalachia
(such as the anonymised rural community of Colton).
He seeks to understand both their daily, taken-for-
granted, habitual lives and how ‘they accommodate to
turning points and transitional events in their lives’
(Rowles, 2000, p. 53S), appealing to complexity theory
in the search for this understanding. He looks at the
daily routines of older people within their communities
as ‘part of a whole, a social ecology that functioned as a
delicately balanced homeostatic system’ (Rowles, 2000,
p. 55S). Interestingly, he cites Roger Barker’s ecological
psychology here and, as an aside, this approach to
psychology and place is something that geographers in
general, and health geographers in particular, seem to
have missed (Barker, 1968). But Rowles seems keen to
move from interesting biographical accounts to ‘con-
sider each resident of Colton as immersed in a complex
system of inextricably interrelated actions, relationships,
and environmental meanings that are in a state of
homeostatis. This homeostasis has its own dynamic,
with consequences reverberating throughout the system
when any element changes’ (Rowles, 2000, p. 59S).
Thus, the ecology is disrupted when people die or
become ill (and the network of relationships thereby
changes). Their lives are ‘immersed in messy, compli-
cated, interconnected systems that are not linear, static,
or absolutely predictable’ (Rowles, 2000, p. 61S). Aside
from wondering what ‘linear’ means in this context this
remark seems rather uncontroversial, since all of us live
lives that have the same characteristics. I am not
convinced that our understanding of the mental well-
being of older Appalachian folk is significantly enhanced
by Rowles’ appeal to complexity theory. I would argue
that we gain as much—maybe more—from the time-
space geographies that Ha¨gerstrand (1970) proposed,
long before complexity theory emerged, and which
Rowles himself cites. Alternatively, very sophisticated
and engaging accounts of lives lived in particular places
(for example, Davidson, 2003) have been developed
without a wholly metaphorical use of complexity theory.Missing themes and added value: concluding remarks
There must, in principle, be scope for other complex-
ity accounts in the geography of health. Urry (2003,
p. 44) asks us to examine ‘the complex sets of social
relations between the national and the global. They
constitute each other’. Thus we need to examine how
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impact on global patterns of ill-health, and how
processes operating at the global scale (such as climate
change, global spread of infectious disease, or invest-
ment decisions by global companies and international
organisations) impact nationally. For example, global
health-care organisations (large pharmaceutical compa-
nies) and global institutions such as the World Bank
have major impacts on health-care delivery in particular
countries. ‘Through their interdependence, these institu-
tions of governance and civil society are organising the
rules, structures and regulations of the newly emergent
global order’ (Urry, 2003, p. 81). But, set against this,
and notwithstanding the cross-border flows to seek
faster and perhaps better health care abroad, we still
have in most of the developed world largely autonomous
national health-care policies and structures.
I think we can claim at least three missing ‘elements’
in CT accounts. First, the human voice seems to be
missing from much of the complexity theory. The
qualitative is there, but in the form of qualitative
structures and patterns, not in the nature of the
embodied actor. An exception might be Rowles’ work,
though I have argued above that a complexity perspec-
tive offers relatively little in our understanding of lived
worlds in small rural communities. Is the behaviour of a
small number of older people in an isolated setting so
very complex? Stewart (2001) considers that ‘[T]he bulk
of writing on social complexity is decidedly limited in its
relation to social relevant philosophical traditions such
as phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and
modernist retrieval of lived experience in a devastated
world’ (Stewart, 2001, p. 334). He bemoans the neglect
of real lives and actors (real people in contested
history—Stewart, 2001, p. 354). Some complexity
theorists appear to agree. As Baraba´si has it: ‘The goal
before us is to understand complexity. To achieve that,
we must move beyond structure and topology and start
focusing on the dynamics that take place along the links.
Networks are only the skeleton of complexity, the
highways for the various processes that make our world
hum. To describe society we must dress the links of the
social network with actual dynamical interactions
between people’ (Baraba´si, 2002, p. 225).
Second, gender too seems to be a missing strand from
existing uses of CT. Complexity theory appears to be a
singularly male enterprise, with women invisible as
authors within this particular ‘invisible college’. I cannot
explain why this might be so, and am reminded of an
interesting passage in John Fowles’ ‘complex’ novel, The
Magus (revised edition, Granada Publishing, London,
1977):
Men see objects, women see the relationships
between objects. Whether the objects need each
other, love each other, match each other. It is anextra dimension of feeling we men are without and
one that makes war abhorrent to all real women—
and absurd. I will tell you what war is. War is a
psychosis caused by an inability to see relationships.
Thrift (1999) notes that complexity theory is ‘heter-
archical’ rather than hierarchical and for this reason it
might be thought to appeal to feminist audiences. It is
puzzling that few writers in this field are women and
that, as yet, complexity theorists have not engaged with
gender debates.
Third, I would argue too that, despite assertions of
interconnectedness, globalisation, and the linking of
‘everything to everything else’ (Baraba´si, 2002, p. 7), we
have not yet presided over the death of distance.
Territory and a sense of identity with particular places
still matters. Spatial segregation has health impacts, our
social connections and support at local level still
matters, and the connections and relations stressed by
complexity theorists are still very firmly local, at least for
some. Those living in affluent countries might be
exposed to viruses circulating in Africa or elsewhere
(Haiti, for example, Farmer, 1992, 1999) and such
viruses may well have impacts that become global in
their reach. But the impact, in terms of disease burden, is
surely many times more acute in the poorest regions of
the world.
We should welcome any considered attempt to
introduce new theoretical perspectives into health
geography, a field that has been traditionally under-
theorised (Litva & Eyles, 1995). However, the success of
complexity theory in the health sciences in general, and
health geography in particular, is not yet assured. ‘For
example, in biology a reductionist molecular approach
(typified by the human genome project) still holds away’
(Thrift, 1999, p. 39). The same point might be made of
randomised controlled trials in medical and health
research and in many of the geographies of health that
we write that rely on (largely regression-based) methods
that are reductionist in nature.
If health geographers are to engage seriously with CT,
we need to move beyond purely metaphorical uses and
to conduct empirical work that genuinely uses its
concepts in a rigorous way. One cannot help avoiding
the conclusion that it is easier to talk about complex
interacting systems, emergence and non-linearity than to
knuckle down and do useful empirical research on such
systems. Haggett’s comment that ‘one can do little with
the unique except contemplate its uniqueness’ (Haggett,
1965, p. 3) is equally true of some invocations of
complexity. There is a clear need to move beyond the
casual use of metaphor and to explore further the
added value of CT for our research in disease
ecology, health inequalities and spatial diffusion, all
traditional—and still critically important—areas in
health geography.
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